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Abstract 
In space information network, the long delay and high link error rate are the most different 
characteristics from the traditional ground network. Based on the queuing game theory, a novel congestion 
control is proposed in this paper. It assumes that the users pay an admission fee for entering the queue, 
and then cost during the waiting time, at last they obtain a benefit from the node when they are serviced 
completely. This paper not only designs a variable admission fee in order that the proposed algorithm is 
more suitable for the space environment, but also considers the ending profits of the game which is 
described by a discount rate. The simulation result shows the proposed algorithm improve the network 
performance. 
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1. Introduction  
The space information network is developed and formed on the basis of the ground 
network. It consists of the deep space network, the satellite network, the aviation network and 
the traditional ground network [1]. Under the current situation that each country begins to snatch 
the limited communications resources over space, how to utilize space information network 
resources efficiently has become a focus [2]. Therefore, whether a congestion control scheme is 
good or not is extremely important. However, due to the long delay and the high link error rate of 
the high layer network including the deep space network and the satellite network [3], the 
traditional congestion control method of the ground network is unsuitable for the whole space 
information network.  
In order to solve the congestion problem in the satellite network, there were some 
researchers who proposed reasonable resource allocation schemes as in [4]. The authors 
adjusted the traffic speed by changing the congestion window size of the node in the network. 
These schemes were all based on the feedback information of the nodes [5, 6]. Although these 
schemes were able to reflect the current network state, the too long delay caused by the 
propagation of the inquiry and feedback information led the network resources waste. 
Considering the global situation of the network, authors in [7] built a bargaining model based on 
game theory. They observed and analyzed the characteristic of the network resource from the 
perspective of game theory, which offered a new idea for dealing with the network congestion. 
What’s more, authors in [8] formulated a complex mathematical model based on the stochastic 
differential game theory. It described dynamic changes of network resources at any time, and 
obtained an optimal strategy for resource allocation through solving the feedback Nash 
equilibrium of the model. It was built according to the real network environment and could be 
solving, but some other models which were built in the same way might not exist the 
corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium solution.  
In this paper, a congestion control algorithm based on queuing game for space 
information network (CCQGS). Queuing game theory was firstly presented by Naor as shown in 
[9]. It modeled a queuing system which was belonged to the economic field by combining 
queuing and game theory. A constant admission fee was defined to restrict the action of 
customers whether to join the queue. In contrast, we design a dynamic admission fee instead of 
the constant admission fee to adapt the real-time changes in space information network. The 
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application of CCQGS makes the network social profit reaches the maximum. Then we get the 
optimal queue length to achieve the congestion control in space information network. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the system model is 
described. The design of congestion control algorithm under the queuing game model is given 
in Section 3. The simulation and comparisons are done in Section 5. At last, we drew a 
conclusion in Section 6. 
 
 
2. System Model 
CCQGS is designed to balance the space information network load and reduce the 
congestion. It determines the rules for users to enter the queues of the system nodes. Since a 
newly arrived user needs to wait for the service if there are other users in front of him, this 
waiting time causes an extra income when the service ends. We describe it as a discount rate 
[10] in the following system model. 
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Figure 1. The system model of congestion control for space information network 
 
 
In our proposed model as shown in Figure 1, a user  i i N  who wants to enter the 
space information network will obtain the user’s benefit R  from the system if the service is 
completed. However, the user i  needs to pay an admission fee i  before joining the queue of 
the service node. Users arrive as Poisson distribution with the arrival rate   and the network 
nodes service time follow exponential distribution with the service rate  [11]. When a user 
enters the queue and before being serviced, he must wait for a period of time which forms the 
waiting cost per unit time C . The current number of users in the queue called the queue length 
are denoted as l .  
The gain  iG l  of user i  is the criteria for deciding whether to join the queue or not. It 
is computed by the user’s benefit subtracting the admission fee and the waiting cost. If 
  0iG l  , the user will join the queue. On the contrary, if   0iG l  , the user will balk because 
there is no gains even losses for him. Notice that the service node announces the gain  iG l  to 
the user i , it utilizes the user’s benefit R  which should be obtained after service completed. 
Therefore, a discount rate   is introduced in our proposed system model.  
In traditional queuing game model, the admission fee is set as a constant. This define is 
not suitable under the space information network environment. We redefine the admission fee is 
a variable associated with the queue length l . As a result, the admission fee of our system 
model is denoted by  i l . Once the node cannot service the users in the queue timely, it will 
increase the admission fee in order to prevent too many users to join the queue, and then 
reduce the possibility of network congestion. The relevant parameters in this paper are shown in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1. Specifications of the parameters of CCQGS 
Parameters Meaning 
  The user’s arrival rate  
  The node’s service rate 
  Utilization factor =


 
l  The queue length of service node 
R  The user’s benefit after service completed 
C  The waiting cost of the user in the system per unit time 
  The discount rate 
 
 
3. A Congestion Control Algorithm Based on Queuing Game 
The system welfare consists of the user’s gain and the node’s profit mainly from the 
admission fee. Due to the determined user’s benefit and the increasing admission fee with the 
increasing queue length, the user’s gain and the node’s profit are conflicting. When the queue 
length grows, the user’s gain decreases. Once it is less than zero, the user balks the queue. 
Meanwhile, the node’s profit increases. We assumes that a user joins the queue at time 0 and 
complete the service at time 1t . In our system model, the system welfare of user i  can be 
calculated as: 
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Where te   denotes ending benefits. 
After getting the each user’s system welfare, the average system welfare contribution 
can be computed as: 
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Where lq  denotes the probability of observing l  users in the queue. 
According to the restriction condition   0iG l  , CCQGS judges a user can join the 
queue only if he satisfies this condition. Our congestion control algorithm is an initiative scheme, 
so that users are able to choice the favorable behavior. We turn this restriction to a threshold 
queue length of node. It is easy for user’s discrimination. The user’s gain  iG l  can be 
calculated as: 
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Because that the service time of the node in space information network follows the 
exponential distribution with a parameter  . When a new user arrives to the node and observes 
that there have been l  users already in the queue, the service completed time 1t  follows the 
Erlang distribution with parameters  and 1l  . According to these assumption we obtains the 
formulation as: 
 
 1 1it lE e      (4) 
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Where 

 


. 
Computing the expression in (3), we can obtains: 
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When the user’s gain satisfies   0iG l  , the restrictionexpression can be rewrite as 
follow: 
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If the user’s gain not only satisfies   0iG l  , but also satisfies  1 0iG l   , this queue 
length is the threshold denoted as thl . The conditions are given as: 
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Solving the above the inequality equations, the threshold queue length thl  is calculated 
as: 
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Where thl N . 
The user firstly comes to the space information network, and then the service node 
announces an admission fee to the user with the consideration of the current number of users in 
the queue. The user calculates his gain according to the received admission fee and the waiting 
cost. If the user’s gain is no less than zero, he joins the queue. Otherwise he balks. During the 
discussion of the user’s gain, a threshold queue length is deducted for the congestion control 
scheme for space information network. The flow chart of CCQGS is draw as Figure 2. 
After the threshold queue length has been calculated, we get the upper bound of the 
queue length. This restriction is used for maximizing the systemwelfare and balancing the load 
of the network. To make our algorithm suit for space information network, we introduce the 
ending profit to the game model. It describes the information transmission behaviors more 
suitable with the actual situation. For single node, the user comes and decides whether to join 
the queue or not which only deponds on his gain. On the other word, if the length of the queue 
beyonds thl , the user will balk. However, due to the gains of the joined users are non-negative, 
the system welfare will stay in a optimal level. At last, the congestion control improve the 
performance of the network. 
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Figure 2. The flow chart of CCQGS 
 
 
4. Simulation and Comparisons 
In this section, we give some simulations and analysis to prove the correctness and the 
effectiveness of CCQGS. Firstly, the influence of the discount rate   to the threshold queue 
length thl  is experimented. Under the restriction condition of thl , Matlab is used to calculate the 
interrelated parameters and show the numerical result. It is helpful for us to realize the extra 
benefit of system from ending profit of the game. Then we observe the relationship between the 
queue length and the arrival rate. Users in space information network come with different 
probabilities, for understanding the impact to the system, we do the second experiment. Since 
our algorithm is based on queuing game theory which is rarely used in congestion control, it is 
hard to compare with other similar algorithm. We just do some numerical simulation to analysis 
and compare the results with different parameters.  
On basis of the queuing game theory, we built the system model and simulate the 
network environment. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2. The value of the simulation parameters 
    R  C  
40 60 100 10 
 
 
In this simulation, we define the admission fee  l l   to shown the changes of the 
system. The discount rate is assumed as  0.01,0.02,0.03,0.04,0.05,0.06,0.07,0.08,0.08,0.1  . 
As shown in Figure 3, with the increase of the discount rate  , the threshold queue length thl  
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decreases. The reason is that   express the ending profits. The more  is, the smaller the 
user’s gain becomes. Once the user’s gain drops, the new arrival user will balk the queue with 
the restriction   0iG l  . Due to thl N , we round the value in the simulation and get the 
threshold queue length. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Threshold queue length for different   
 
 
As shown in Figure 4, we can observe the threshold queue length thl  grows with the 
increase of the service rate  . When the service rates are the same, the threshold queue 
length is lower with the larger discount rate. It means that after users join in the queue of the 
node in space information network, if the node services the more users per unit time, the more 
network traffic can be processed in our proposed model.The threshold queue length denotes 
the capacity of node. The higher it is, the more information can be handled in the system. 
According to the queuing game model, we can get the optimal system welfare and avoid the 
network congestion. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Threshold queue length for different   
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5. Conclusion 
Considering the special space information network environment, we design a 
congestion control algorithm CCQGS to achieve the reasonable distribution of network 
resources. On the basis of the queuing theory and the game theory, a system model is 
formulated to reduce the probability of the congestion occurring. We define a variable admission 
fee instead of a constant one so that the model can describe the network system more real. 
Besides, a discount rate is introduced to the proposed model to present the ending profit of the 
game. At last, better performance of the network is obtained in the simulations. 
In the future work, we will do some reseaches on the performance comparision between 
our algorithm and others and solve the routing problem in space information network. 
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